Introduction
In August 2006, Sheikh Abdul Sittar of Albu Risha Sunni tribe pledged his support to the US forces in Ramadi, Iraq. In less than two month period, over 1,500 tribal fighters flocked into the local police training centre, which, since the arrival of Americans in 2003, only managed to recruit 150 locals (Kukis, 2006) . These new recruits were the first wave of Sunni combatants voluntarily mobilised to fight against fellow Sunni al-Qaeda insurgents in Anbar province. The Ramadi tribal volunteers, who later became part of a larger Sunni anti-al-Qaeda force "Sons of Iraq" (Abna al-Iraq), were neither first nor the last ethnic defectors in contemporary armed conflicts. Although the practice of mobilising against co-ethnics dates back to antiquity, research on ethnic defection remains limited to a small group of studies. It is the seminal article by Stathis N. Kalyvas (2008) on ethnic defection that has invigorated the debate on side-switching in intrastate conflicts. Defined as "a process whereby individuals join organizations explicitly opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify and end up fighting against their coethnics" (Kalyvas, 2008 (Kalyvas, , p. 1045 , ethnic defection occurs in many contemporary ethnic conflicts. Scholars associated the emergence of ethnic defectors with dynamics of counterinsurgency (Lyall, 2010) , internal processes within insurgent organisations (Staniland, 2012) , or patterns of double-defection (Souleimanov et al., 2016) .
Notwithstanding the significance of ethnic defection in intrastate conflicts, the process of ethnic side-switching remains rather under-explored and poorly understood. As observed by Lyall (2010, p. 16) , "theoretical discussions of rebel defection are curiously few in the existing literature." A number of fundamental questions remain unanswered about the processes, which lead individuals to supporting "competitor" ethnic groups. What other factors, besides loyalty to a regime and material incentives, are responsible for ethnic defection? Why does mass ethnic defection occur even in conflicts lacking identity shift and with limited state capacity to sponsor defectors?
In order to explain the global occurrence of ethnic defection across a variety of intrastate armed conflicts, this study advances the theory of ethnic responsibility which posits that individuals join "competitor" ethnic group to fight against their co-ethnics driven by the obligation to protect their perceived ethnic values. Ethnic values are sociocultural, ideological connections between the theoretical claim and empirical findings and summarising prospects for future research and practice.
East Ukraine: Anatomy of an ethnic conflict
In 2014-15, Ukraine experienced a series of unprecedented political and economic shocks.
The Euromaidan protests leading to the violent overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovich, annexation of Crimean peninsula by Russia, and election of pro-Western government in Kiev, all culminated with large-scale armed conflict between Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists in self-declared Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Lugansk People's Republic (LNR) in eastern Donbas region. Since the first months of East Ukraine conflict, scholars and analysts alike associated violence in Donbas with identity politics, such as historical Ukrainian East-West divide, and ethnic grievances between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in Donbas (Petro, 2015; Klinova, 2014; Kudelia, 2014) . These claims were challenged by the proponents of economic causes, who argued that Donbas's lucrative coal and metal industry, and the access to resources have fuelled the conflict (Zhukov, 2016; Giuliano, 2015) . Russian intervention was further cited as decisive towards conflict entrenchment and continuity (Wilson, 2016) . Another strand of literature that has emerged in the aftermath of Ukraine's conflict is research on the relationship between language, ethnic identity and support for separatism (Arel, 2018; Sasse & Lackner, 2018) . Although many have observed the complexity of ethnic identity and language matters in the Ukrainian context (Kulyk, 2018) , few efforts were made to explore links between ethnicity and wartime mobilisation on both sides of the dyad (Zhukov, 2016 ). Yet, it is due to the complexity of ethnic aspects in Ukraine that armed conflict in Donbas offers unique perspectives into understanding an ethnic conflict.
Firstly, let's look into the broader aspect of ethnicity in present-day Ukraine. One particular caveat that scholars of ethnic grievances often disregard is that in Ukraine's ethnic identity and corresponding ethnic values are defined not in accordance with the belonging to an ethnic group, but as based on first-language preferences. In their recent study, Onuch and Hale (2018) argue that in the context of Ukraine, ethnicity and language preferences do not necessarily overlap. A similar finding was presented by Ivanov (2015) , who described that the choice of language is far more significant for Ukrainians than their ethnic identity. Due to decades of Sovietisation and Russification under the Soviet rule, ethnic identities collapsed and merged. In the words of Kulyk (2018, p.120) , Ukraine: "inherited a very large number of people who considered themselves Russians by nationality and an even larger number of those who retained their ethnonational self-designation as Ukrainians but spoke Russian as their main language of everyday life." Notwithstanding popular claims that there are three major ethnic groups in present-day Ukraine: "Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians", "Russian-speaking Ukrainians" and "Russians" (Miller, 1994, p. 1) , there is plentiful evidence that "Russian-speaking" Ukrainians largely identify themselves as both Russians and Ukrainians (Pirie, 1996 (Pirie, , p. 1080 . Drawing on survey findings, Riabchuk (2015, p. 145) observes that "only plurality of Ukrainians identified themselves primarily with Ukraine, whereas most of them defined their primary loyalties as either local, regional, residual Soviet, or supranational East Slavonic." In the same vein, Gentile (2015, p. 202) concludes that based on survey findings: "[W]ith the exception of Crimea, most Russian-speakers in Ukraine identify as Russian-speaking Ukrainians, not as Russians." The same rule applied to pre-2014 Donbas, where, as explained by Gentile (2015, p. 202) , "Russian is the language spoken by the overwhelming majority of the population, but over 60% identify as Ukrainians." This ethno-linguistic mismatch is best explained by Brubaker's (2004) theory of ethnicity without clearly-delineated ethnic groups, which posits that homogenous ethnic groups with clear-cut identification and linguistic boundaries are hard to find anywhere in the world.
It is noteworthy from recent survey data that even the process of Ukrainianness that has been unleashed by the post-Maidan government in order to replace Russian language with Ukrainian in all spheres of life has not been particularly effective in convincing Russianspeaking Ukrainians to switch to using exclusively Ukrainian language. Thus, Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2018, p. 116) found in their survey-based study that although numbers of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers have not changed in pre-and post-Maidan Ukraine, they observed notable increase in the perception of Ukraine as homeland. This indicates that instead of changing their ethnic identities and values, Russian-speakers become better integrated into their country of citizenship.
The East Ukraine conflict which is often described as a war between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians (Sakwa, 2014) is in fact conflict where the majority of participants are either Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians or Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Representatives of the latter, depending on which side of the frontline they are, identify themselves as either Russians or Ukrainians. Nevertheless, it is a well-established and widely reported fact that Russian-speakers are participating in the armed conflict on both sides. A mounting evidence of Russian-speakers involved in the conflict on the Ukrainian side began to emerge soon after the escalation of East Ukraine conflict in April-May 2014. As pointed by Riabchuk (2015, p. 148) , "Moscow encountered a fierce resistance of Ukrainian troops and volunteer battalions largely completed with the same proverbial 'Russians and Russophones'." Arel (2018, p. 3) observed that "Russian is still fairly prevalent socially, including at the frontlines (many, if not most, battalions operate in Russian)." A similar observation was made by Zhukov (2016, p. 4) , who describes that: "Russian has been the language of command in many units of the Ukrainian armed forces, and even in some ultra-nationalist Ukrainian volunteer battalions like 'Azov.'" Indeed, one of the largest paramilitary battalions "Donbas" was formed from Russian-speakers mainly from eastern Ukraine and from the war-affected region of Donbas.
Two other powerful ultra-nationalist battalions "Azov" and "Right Sector" also have large numbers of Russian-speakers in their ranks (Schwetz, 2014; Abramovich, 2014; Praviy Sektor, 2014) . It has been reported that a significant proportion of fighters in the "Right Sector" are from eastern and southern Ukraine (Tsibenko, 2014; Vadjra, 2016) . There are numerous Russian-speakers not only amongst rank-and-file combatants in pro-Ukrainian forces, but also at the command level. For instance, the founder and commander of "Azov" battalion, Andriy Biletsky, is a Russian-speaker from eastern city of Kharkiv, and the commander of "Donbas" battalion is an ethnic-Russian from Donetsk. In Zhukov's (2016, p. 4) words: "The Facebook page of Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov-where he issues official press releases on operations by the National Guard-is in Russian." Pro-government paramilitary battalions, the National Guard, and Special Forces of the Ministry of Interior (MVD) compose the bulk of Ukrainian armed forces involved in counterinsurgency operation (Anti-Terrorist Operation -ATO) in Donbas region. Remarkably all of these units are dominated by Russian-speakers from eastern, southern and (less so) central parts of Ukraine, rather than by Ukrainian-speakers from western regions. This suggests that Russian-speakers bore the brunt of fighting during the active phase of East Ukraine conflict from April 2014 to March 2015.
All of the above raises a question as to why Ukraine's Russian-speakers volunteered en masse to fight against fellow Russian-speakers from DNR and LNR? Why the call from separatists to rise against Ukraine's government and its efforts to de-Russify the country has backfired, drawing thousands of Russian-speakers to join the government against the rebels?
Amongst many other post-Cold War intrastate conflicts, East Ukraine war is a unique case of massive ethnic defection, which has occurred regardless of the lack of state capacity to enforce or induce defection, to use coercive force, or even to facilitate effective identity shift processes. The following theoretical sections will seek to offer answers to this puzzle, which will then be empirically examined in the second half of the paper.
Theorising ethnic defection
The fundamental principle of ethnic defection is transformation of identity which enables individuals to acquire "a new ethnic (or national) identity that replaces the old one" (Kalyvas, 2008 (Kalyvas, , p. 1045 . The acquisition of new identity facilitates individuals to mobilise in support of an ethnic group(s), which opposes ethno-nationalist aspirations of their own ethnicity.
However, there are two intrinsic problems with the relationship between identity shift and ethnic defection. First is that for identity shift to take place, individuals need to be able to strongly identify themselves with an ethnic group. Second is that it may not be necessary to change ethnic identity in order switch sides in an ethnic conflict.
To start with, identity shift is only likely to occur when the conflict involves two or more ethnic groups with clearly defined ethnic identities. Bearing in mind that identity shift is a process of acquiring new ethnic identity, it only becomes possible if an individual already has a fully-formed ethno-nationalist identity. For individuals lacking clear-cut ethnic identification, participation in violent conflict on the side of a "competitor" ethnic group may not require identity shift and may not even involve identity-building processes. In the absence of fully-formed ethnic identity, joining an armed organisation in opposition to individual's own ethnic group may not be seen as defection or betrayal. Rather, participation in an ethnonationalist conflict on the incumbent's side might be perceived as an "ethnic duty" to restore peace and stability. For example, joining Spanish security forces in their fight against ETA was seen by many Basque recruits as part of their ethnic responsibility to restore law and order in the Basque country (Sullivan, 2015) . In a similar vein, anti-LTTE (Tigers of Tamil Eelam) militias in Sri Lanka were motivated -amongst other reasons -by ethnic responsibility (Stokke, 2006 (Souleimanov, 2015) . Ethnic defection despite the lack of identity shift has been described to occur due to "loyalism" towards the state actor (Kalyvas, 2008 (Kalyvas, , p. 1050 . However, even from the perspective of loyalism -which entails that individuals switch their loyalties (not identities) to a stronger actor -it is hard to explain why hundreds or thousands of people take up arms against their co-ethnics on the incumbent side. For example, loyalism fails to provide an exhaustive explanation as to why thousands of Chechen ethno-nationalist rebels -who had little sympathy for Russiansswitched sides during the Second Chechen war. Loyalism also provides no clues as to why Iraqi Sunni tribesmen, many of whom fought in the "Sunni Triangle" against the US troops, decided to turn their weapons against Sunni insurgents and to align with Shiite government in Baghdad. In the same vein, decisions of Afghan Pashtuns to join the Northern Alliance and the US, or of Iraqi Kurdish fursan to collaborate with Ba'th regime were hardly dictated by the sense of loyalty to their sworn enemies (Voller, 2014 
State capacity and revenge
The extant literature argued that ethnic defection is heavily influenced by constructivist causes. For instance, Kalyvas (2008 Kalyvas ( , p. 1051 stated that ethnic defection is likely to take place in stronger states which have the capacity to hold and control most of their territory.
However, numerous cases of ethnic defection in weak or even failed states suggest that further explanation is needed (Aliyev, 2017b) . For example, ethnic defections during the Sudanese civil war, Somalia's civil war, and Myanmar's conflicts with Karen and Kachin rebels, the East Ukraine conflict, as well as Uganda's conflict with LRA (Lord Resistance Army) demonstrate that state weakness did not prevent the government from welcoming defectors. Instead the lack of state capacity to defeat the rebels, increases incentives for the incumbent to encourage ethnic defection amongst rebellious ethnicities (Eck, 2015) . State capacity emerges as crucial when it comes to allocation of resources to defectors, such as wages, weapons and funding, which may facilitate further defections. Yet even in the absence of extensive state resources to attract ethnic defectors, the prospect of legitimisation within state structures, land rights, or simply control over tribal or ethnic affairs and administration may be sufficient for ethnic defectors to convince them in benefits of side switching.
The other previously rehearsed argument about ethnic defection is that it is more likely to occur "in later stages of a war" (Kalyvas, 2008 (Kalyvas, , p. 1051 , because it would take time for would-be defectors to develop grudge against the rebels and to seek revenge. Indeed, quest for revenge has played central role in ethnic defection in Chechnya (Souleimanov & Aliyev, 2015) , Turkey (Gurcan, 2015) , Algeria (Roux, 1991) , and many other conflicts (Kalyvas, 2008 (Kalyvas, , p. 1054 . The theme of revenge aligns with the logic of ethnic responsibility in that individuals perceive rebel actions as a form of personal or ethnic offense and switch sides to punish their offenders. Staniland (2012) describes fratricidal violence within ethnic rebel groups in Kashmir and Sri Lanka as the key incentive for defection. Revenge may also acquire individualistic character whereby ethnic defectors seek to avenge personal offenses (Souleimanov et al., 2016 ). Yet in many conflicts ethnic defection occurs at very early stages. 
The logic of ethnic responsibility
The key theoretical argument of this study is that ethnic defection occurs not only as a result of an identity shift -which leads to individuals adopting a new ethnic identity -but most of all due to responsibility to uphold and protect ethnic values. Although ethnic rebels tend to portray themselves as defenders of ethnic values, their interpretation of ethnic identity may not be readily accepted by all of their co-ethnics. Less or more traditionalist or radical interpretations of ethno-nationalist aspirations are causes of splits within rebel organisations or rebel constituencies which often lead to defection (Gates, 2002) . This study proposes that ethnic defection, which occurs in many contemporary armed conflicts, is, above all, motivated by the emergence of ethnic responsibility.
The logic of ethnic responsibility is as follows. To start with, rebel actions against the incumbent are perceived by ethnic defectors as counter-productive or harmful for their own co-ethnics. Disregard for local sociocultural customs, forms of social organisation and religious traditions, and their replacement with foreign ideologies are amongst the most common forms of violating ethnic values. This evokes the sense of collective responsibility to safeguard and "restore" ethnic values and to dislodge the rebels even if it requires taking arms against co-ethnics and joining an actor opposed to their ethno-nationalist aspirations.
All of the above is likely, but not necessarily, to be filtered through the presence of an external actor, which may be either in form of a direct military assistance, or as ideological influence and/or financial aid. In many cases, external intervention in support of rebels, both in form of military assistance and, or ideological influence, is likely to strengthen the sense of ethnic responsibility and to encourage ethnic defection. Below, I explain the logic of ethnic responsibility in details.
Unlocking ethnic responsibility
Preserving ethnic identity and defending ethnic values might serve as key motivations driving individuals to fight against their co-ethnics. Scholars describe ethnic conflicts as confrontations over ethno-nationalist aspirations (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Wimmer, 2008) . However, ethno-nationalist ideology has been described in conflict studies as one of the most divisive for inter-group unity forms of ideologies. For instance, Esteban and Ray (2008) theorised that for ethnicity-based groups it is much harder to maintain intra-group homogeneity than for political ideology, religion, or class-defined groups. This leads towards an assumption that while ethno-nationalist objectives can encourage ethnic unity in some ethnic groups, they can also divide others. In other words, ethnic values can be understood differently within the same ethnic group (Knight et al., 1993) . Ethnic dissent and radicalisation may lead to split and to divisions encouraging co- Previous research has shown that although ethnic values are at the base of ethno-nationalist aspirations of ethnic groups, ethnic rebels may choose to transform, supplement, "upgrade" or merge them with political and religious sectarian ideologies (Sayigh, 1989) (Souleimanov & Aliyev, 2015) . Chechen recruits into pro-values from "outside" Arab-influenced brand of Jihadi Islam (Ratelle, 2016; Souleimanov, 2015) . (Behuria, 2007; Barfield, 2011; Giustozzi, 2010) The revenge argument (Kalyvas, 2008 (Kalyvas, , p. 1051 further supports the logic of ethnic responsibility. Although it is possible that some ethnic defectors will seek revenge for individually inflicted grievances, for many, particularly in traditional and honorific societies, revenge is an issue of restoring one's honour or adhering to customary laws (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Souleimanov & Aliyev, 2015) . Nevertheless, ethnic responsibility differs from revenge in that it is not only directed at avenging offenses, but also aimed at restoring and safeguarding ethnic values and traditions. Ethnic responsibility emerges not only during the conflict onset, but also at its later stages when ethnic grievances can be expected to accumulate and accentuate.
External trigger
In all of the above examples of ethnic defection, involvement of a third-party actor supporting rebels -either directly or indirectly -has been instrumental towards evoking ethnic responsibility and encouraging ethnic defectors to join the government. Ethnic grievances experienced by ethnic minority groups were often rehearsed by scholars of ethnic conflicts as key factors behind ethno-secessionist conflicts (Collier, 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Cederman et al., 2010; Buhaug et al., 2014) . However, ethnic grievances are not only intrinsic to ethnic minorities persecuted by governments, but can also occur when external actors seek to influence ethnic groups by supporting ethno-nationalist rebellions. External intervention -including ideological and military -has as many chances to strengthen insurgency as to create splits within ethnic groups. Studies on pro-rebel third-party interventions in intrastate wars detail that outside influence often encourages disagreements amongst rebels, which in some cases lead to dissent (Salehyan, 2009; Aydin & Regan, 2012) . (Souleimanov & Aliyev, 2015) . Similarly to the Chechen example, Pashtun discontent with Taliban was not openly expressed until the start of the US military campaign, which served as a trigger for ethnic defection amongst Pashtun tribes and clans (Friedberg, 2002) .
Notwithstanding the significance of external influence, not all episodes of ethnic defection involve external actors. The well-known cases of ethnic defection without third-actor intervention were amongst Uganda's LRA, Kurdish PKK, Shi Lankan LTTE and Kenya's Mau Mau insurgency. However, the aforementioned rebel groups, alongside ethno-nationalist aspirations, heavily relied on personal charisma of their leaders and on ethnically divisive political or religious ideologies, which were seen by co-ethnics as equally damaging to ethnic values.
Greed-driven?
Similarly to other grievances ethnic responsibility "focuses on the public good aspect of rebellion" (Hoeffler, 2011, p. 275) . From the perspective of public good, protection of ethnic values provides an explanation as to why individuals choose to fight against their co-ethnics.
However, as with many other rebellions, which start as grievances-driven conflicts, ethnic defections may also be influenced by material incentives. Mobilising on the stronger actor's side, enables ethnic defectors to reap material benefits, which they would be unable to access when supporting rebels. Although material greed may not always be considered by would-be ethnic defectors when first making decisions to side-line with the incumbent (Staniland, 2014) , it is still engendered in the defectors' quest for stability -including economic prosperity -and human security for their families and broader co-ethnics.
Apart from financial rewards associated with loyalty to the incumbent, land rights, control over trade, and access to political offices were amongst material rewards provided to ethnic defectors (Kalyvas, 2006) . Defector armed units are commonly granted official status or are incorporated into formal security structures, as was the case with pro-Moscow Chechen militias kadyrovtsy (Souleimanov et al., 2016) . Anti-Taliban defectors from amongst Pashtuns were granted political offices in the newly-formed Afghan government in 2002 (Hodes & Sedra, 2013) . Provided that the incumbent emerges victorious, defectors will be appointed to govern the rebellious region, or their own ethnic group. Indeed, the practice of appointing loyal locals to leading administrative positions has been a long-standing governance strategy, dating back to the Roman Empire (Ando, 2013) . Widely used by the British during the era of colonial expansion, "loyal appointments" became a norm of British colonial rule, particularly in the aftermath of the Great Mutiny (Iyer, 2010) .
While the protection of ethnic values may serve as the key driver of ethnic defection, material incentives offer extra motivations for defectors encouraging them to seek not only political stability, but also economic benefits of mobilising against their co-ethnics. Bearing in mind that ethnic defectors provide government with indispensable intelligence and local knowledge (of terrain) crucial in counterinsurgency campaigns (Lyall, 2010) , incumbents tend to supply defector militias with weapons and equipment, as well as with salaries (Clayton & Thomson, 2014) . Even in the absence of other material benefits, access to military hardware and regular payments may seem sufficient to sustain defection.
Methods and data
Studying ethnic defection during the East Ukraine conflict provides a unique opportunity to examine complex dynamics of ethnic responsibility on an understudied ethnic conflict.
Exploring this single case allows analysing the key factors that may be accountable for the emergence of ethnic responsibility: perceived misrepresentation of ethnic values by rebels, foreign influence, identity shift, the effects of state capacity, material incentives and loyalty.
By analysing a single case study, this study benefits from the opportunity to capture both micro-and macro-level dynamics, which often elude cross-national analyses. Bearing in mind that ethnic defection has occurred under very similar conditions elsewhere (Turkey, Myanmar, Philippines, etc.), the Ukrainian case has broad implications for research on ethnic responsibility in ethnically diverse societies.
This study draws the bulk of its empirical data from qualitative semi-structured face-toface interviews with Russian-speaking members of Ukrainian pro-government volunteer were originally from eastern regions, these included 7 participants from Donetsk, 27 (31%) from central and 28 (32%) from southern regions.
Interviews lasted from twenty minutes to one hour, depending on the informants' willingness to engage with the researcher. All interviews were based on a semi-structured list of questions, which enquired informants about reasons for mobilisation, personal perceptions towards the conflict, separatists, Russian identity vs. Ukrainian identity and individual incentives for mobilisation. Informants were encouraged to describe their experiences and opinions as narratives and stories. Due to security concerns, no voice recording devices were used during interviews and answers were recorded as fieldnotes. All interviews were carried out in Russian language. Since interviews were conducted on the condition of strict anonymity, names of informants in this article were replaced with pseudonyms. Narrative analysis was used to code the interview data.
Additional 45 interviews were carried out in Kiev (32) and Dnipro (13) 
Shifting from Russian-speakers into Ukrainians?
The question that looms large is whether an identity shift occurred since the start of East Ukraine conflict? Did the Ukrainisation campaign launched by Petro Poroshenko's government to strengthen Ukrainenness succeed in "converting" Russian-speakers into Ukrainian-speakers and how did it influence wartime mobilisation of Russian-speakers?
Russian-speaking informants both amongst pro-government volunteers and the general public appeared impervious to Ukrainisation. In the words of a respondent from Kiev, "I have volunteer shared a similar story, "No one has ever persuaded me to join. Yes, there was draft, but many of my friends avoided it. When I joined the corps, I was told that I have to pay for tactical gear, and helmet. They issued weapons, but if I wanted to get a newer more functional weapon, I had to give some money to the platoon commander." 10 Many other informants confirmed that not only there were no incentives, or coercive mechanisms facilitating mobilisation, but most were actually compelled to purchase their own uniforms, ammunition and even weapons. The Ukrainian armed forces' lack of capacity (Kuzio, 2000) and widespread corruption at all levels of military administration, inherited from the Soviet period (Cabelkova & Hanousek, 2004; Aliyev, 2016b) , were the key reasons behind ad hoc character of the Ukrainian wartime mobilisation. Scholars and analysts alike cited the absence of coordinated military strategy and efficient planning in Ukraine during the first several months of Donbas conflict (Menon & Rumer, 2015; Rahemtulla & Goncharova, 2016; Akimenko, 2018) . The lack of coordination and planning has led to a series of military defeats that the Ukrainian army suffered in the late April and May 2014, 11 which resulted in the rise of volunteer paramilitary battalions (Aliyev, 2016a ). Yet even paramilitaries did not specifically target Russian-speakers in their recruitment. Rather, as confirmed by the interviewees, volunteer battalions were widely seen as better and more effective alternative to the army. "I joined the [volunteer] battalion not because they 'indoctrinated' me, but because I knew they are not corrupt and that there is no hazing [unlike the army] and that they would actually fight the enemy, not just hide in trenches," 12 a former paramilitary combatant revealed when asked to explain his choice of enlistment. Another member of a volunteer battalion has said that in the mid-2014 his battalion has had no recruitment strategy at all and that it survived "solely on private donations" and that "most of our clothing and food came from the volunteers' families and friends." 13 Notwithstanding the lack of state capacity to motivate recruitment of Russian-speakers, they soon became a sizeable portion of counterinsurgency force in the East Ukraine conflict (Schwetz, 2014) . Much in contrast, Ukrainian-speaking western regions became notorious in 2014 for the largest draft evasion in post-communist history of Ukraine. Jewish-Ukrainian oligarch, Ihor Kolomoisky, were reportedly paid USD1,000 per month in 2015. 16 Starting from the late 2014, members of other paramilitary battalions began receiving individual salaries of USD600 for soldiers and up to USD2,000 for officers. 17 With an average Ukrainian salary of USD250 per month, service in pro-regime forces became a viable career option, which many volunteers were keen on pursuing. As explained by a paramilitary officer: "Lots of our guys joined because they wanted to fight separatists, we paid them nothing and instead they had to pay for everything from their own pockets, but now they remain because they want to make a military career. Its good money, way more than you can make in civilian life." 18 The paradox of 2014-15 pro-government wartime mobilisation is that despite mobilising for the regime, Russian-speakers remain highly critical of the incumbent and display low levels of loyalism, which seemed to serve as recruitment motivation for some. In the words of a paramilitary volunteer, "one of the reasons why I had to join the battalion is because I had no trust in the government and I didn't believe that they are able to make things right in the East. We had to take things into our own hands … because the corrupt oligarchs in power only care about making money." 20 A similar opinion was voiced by an army volunteer who confessed that "I have no trust in the government, but I trust my commanders and I know that they won't sell us even if Avakov [Minister of Interior] orders them to do so." 21 A number of interviewees in volunteer battalions expressed similar views claiming that both President Petro Poroshenko and Arsen Avakov are "corrupt and untrusty" and that it is only "by taking matters into one's own hands" that a real change can be done in Ukraine. Indeed, volunteer battalions are well-known for their disobedience and disregard for the government orders that encapsulates the Russian-speakers' overall preference to "only rely on their own people".
Suspicions that ATO veterans and the battalions' members, as well as the National Guard units, might stage a coup are widespread and often not unfounded. 22 The anti-government attitudes of pro-government fighters reflect the overall perceptions of Ukraine's Russianspeakers. As captured by ZOiS survey (Sasse, 2017, p. 12) , over 85% of respondents in Kievcontrolled Donbas reported low levels of trust to the Ukrainian president. Remarkably, low levels of trust to the government amongst ethnic defectors -indicative of limited loyalism to the regime -are coupled with strong sense of ethnic responsibility to mobilise. was an electrician before, how could he become a 'great ideologue' overnight?." 43 However, the same informant admitted that DNR/LNR were not seen by Russian-speakers as exclusively a "Moscow's pet project", but that there were numerous Donbas natives who have joined the separatists attracted by their ideology. Rather it is Russia's involvement that has severely undermined the separatists' credibility. This suggests that external trigger was instrumental in alienating large segments of Russian-speakers from the separatists' cause.
Ethnic values betrayed

Conclusion
This study has argued that ethnic defection occurs not necessarily due to ethnic identity shift or loyalty to a regime, but owing to ethnic responsibility that draws ethnic defectors to join the government that opposes their co-ethnics. This argument was empirically tested on the case study of Ukrainian pro-government mobilisation amongst Russian-speakers in 2014-15
East Ukraine conflict. As emphasised in the earlier sections of this article, owing to the complex ethno-linguistic context, ethnic fragmentation in Ukraine is defined not in accordance with individuals' ethnic identity, but as based on their linguistic preferences.
Therefore, instead of employing ambiguous and rather inaccurate divisions into ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians, this project investigated ethnic defection along linguistic distinctions into Russian-speakers and Ukrainian-speakers, which appear far more crucial for ethnic identity than the individuals' ethnic origins.
In-depth qualitative interviews with Russian-speakers who joined pro-regime forces against their co-ethnics reveal that pro-government recruits had few other motivations to join apart from ethnic grievances engendered in the negative perception of separatists' objectives and claims. Interviews demonstrate that ethnic defectors were infuriated by the separatists' claim that they protect the rights of Ukraine's Russian-speakers, and that they strife to carve out Russian-speaking territories from the Ukrainian state in order to create a utopian Russianspeaking state of Novorossiya. From the ethnic defectors' perspective, the legitimacy of DNR/LNR claims was undermined by their involvement in organised crime and their quest for personal enrichment as a result of conflict. The separatists' ideology was perceived by ethnic defectors as alien and as imported from abroad. A direct third-party pro-rebel intervention by Russia further cemented the conviction that ethnic values of Ukraine's Russian-speakers were hijacked by a foreign government to achieve its own geopolitical goals. This study has found that although ethnic defectors initially lacked material motivation to mobilise and instead were forced to invest their own resources in order to participate in conflict, the proliferation of the economy of war at later stages of the conflict created a range of material benefits and rewards for ethnic defectors. In contrast to the extant theory of ethnic defection (Kalyvas, 2008 ), Ukraine's ethnic defectors demonstrate particularly low levels of loyalism to the regime that they have fought to protect. Rather it is the weakness of the state and its inability to protect and represent all of its citizens, including ethnic minorities, emerged as one of mobilisation incentives.
This study contributes to understudied topic of ethnic defection on both theoretical and empirical levels. Theoretically, it has proposed that individuals mobilise against their own coethnics on the government's side due to ethnic grievances and constructivist factors such as external influence and material benefits, which do not necessarily require ethnic defectors to shift their ethnic identities or loyalties. Empirically, this is one of the few research works to demonstrate ethnic defection at micro-level drawing on the insights and opinions of conflict participants. That said, this study opens new avenues for future research on ethnic defection suggesting that there might be multiple alternative explanations of the phenomenon. 
